INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the OECD indicated in its report 'Water governance in OECD countries -A multi-level approach' that "water governance 1 remains in a state of confusion." From a legal perspective, the most startling points mentioned to illustrate this state of confusion are, inter alia, the "fragmented institutional structures", the "unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities", and the "poor economic regulations and poorly dra ed legislation." 2 For the Netherlands, the existence of these problems has been con rmed by the OECD's most recent report, 'Water Governance in the Netherlands: Fit for the Future?' In this report, the OECD mentions the "excellent track record on water management in several areas", such as the fact that the Netherlands has developed a "strong economy and robust water industry", this despite that 55% of the Netherlands' territory is below sea level. 3 However, this report also concludes that water governance in the Netherlands "relies on a system of many checks and balances … [and] that system presents some limitations." 4 e OECD further considers that "another striking fact of the Dutch regulatory model is the absolute lack of a third-party institution or independent mechanism for monitoring of overall performance and compliance of the drinking water companies that are in the hands of public shareholders (municipalities and provinces)." 5 More speci cally, a report from the Inspectorate for Transport, Public Works and Water Management concluded that the Dutch drinking water companies could not provide su cient insight in how the drinking water tari for 2012 was established. 6 ese conclusions signal that the current organization of regulation of the drinking water sector might need improvement. In this light, this article examines whether the current organization of economic regulation of the Dutch drinking water sector is adequate, and if needed, how it can be improved. When this contribution refers to economic regulation it refers to the laws, implementing rules and regulatory decisions (such as tari decisions) that regulate the economic obligations and rights of actors in the drinking water sector. e term regulation can be distinguished from the term independent regulator, which is the authority that is independent from the 1 In this article, governance of the water sector is a broad concept that refers to the entire organisation of the water sector, including all stakeholders involved and their relations with the water sector, see OECD (2011), 'Water Governance in OECD Countries: A Multi-level Approach', p. 28. e article focuses on the legal economic part of governance that is referred to as economic regulation. In this context, economic regulation of the drinking water sector is of importance. Economic regulation comprises the legal rules regarding the economic obligations of the actors in the water sector in order to meet predetermined objectives; these objectives are established in water policies. Ibid. 5 Ibid, p. 257. 6 Inspectorate, 'Toezicht Drinkwatertarieven -Beoordeling tarieven 2012'. 221 market parties and to some extent from the politics when applying the laws and rules by adopting regulatory decisions. 7 In order to come to useful recommendations, the paper will rstly introduce the interests which need to be safeguarded and the characteristics of the Dutch drinking water sector. Next, the applicable requirements of EU law will be referred to. Principles of good regulation are introduced to develop a normative framework. Subsequently, the current organization of economic regulation is assessed for its compliance with these principles. Following the assessment, other forms of economic regulation in the energy sector and the UK water sectors are brie y discussed to see whether lessons can be learned for the regulation of the Dutch water sector. ese examples are chosen, as the implementation of the principles of good regulation in these sectors has led to recent changes and improvements of the regulatory regimes. ose changes may serve as a source of inspiration for a re ection on the implementation of the principles of good regulation in the Dutch drinking water sector.
e article concludes with recommendations to improve economic regulation of the Dutch drinking water sector.
PUBLIC INTEREST SAFEGUARDED IN THE DUTCH DRINKING WATER SECTOR
e organizational set-up of the Dutch drinking water sector aims to protect several public interests. According to the Dutch Scienti c Council for Government Policy, a public interest is an interest of importance to society that is liable to be insu ciently safeguarded if the government would not interfere. 8 A small inventory 9 of the public interests which should be safeguarded in the Dutch drinking water sectors shows that economic regulation needs to guarantee that drinking water has to be provided universally 10 whilst ensuring security of supply. 11 For the drinking water companies, the obligation to provide drinking water universally means that every inhabitant of the Netherlands must be able to have access to drinking water 12 and receive it at a (reasonable and) uniform price. If no such universal service obligation would exist, the provision of drinking water in unpro table regions would be jeopardized. It Intersentia should also be guaranteed that captive users are protected 13 against possible consequences of the lack of competition between drinking water companies. Furthermore, environmental and public health considerations should also be taken into account in the economic regulation of the drinking water sector. If not so, there is a risk that the economic regulation con icts with existing regulation in the area of public health and the environment. 14 e next paragraph elaborates how existing economic regulation in the drinking water sector aims to protect the public interests identi ed above. 15 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTCH DRINKING WATER SECTOR
In the Netherlands, ten drinking water companies provide drinking water to all users -i.e. domestic and non-domestic users. A er delivery to the user, a drinking water company is no longer responsible for the supplied water, as in general, responsibility for the collection of wastewater lies with the municipalities. e regional water authorities are in charge of the wastewater treatment. 16 Only drinking water companies may produce and deliver drinking water and each drinking water company has its own supply area, allocated to it by the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment (Minister of I&E). 17 e ownership of a drinking water company is governed by law, as a drinking water company has to be a public legal entity or it has to be directly or indirectly owned by a public legal entity. 18 is means that drinking water is provided by public monopolies, each ensuring the provision of drinking water in an exclusive supply area. 19 e duties of a drinking water company are listed in the Drinking Water Act, which obliges each drinking water company to, inter alia, provide drinking water within its supply area. 20 e Drinking Water Act requires drinking water companies 223 to charge a tari for drinking water that is cost-e ective, transparent and nondiscriminatory. 21 e costs which are made in the exercise of the main tasks may be passed on to users of drinking water, 22 as well as the cost of capital -whereby the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the maximum percentage of equity is demarcated by the Minister of I&E. 23 Drinking water companies have to show how their costs are incorporated in the drinking water tari in their budgets. 24 e Inspectorate for Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Inspectorate) monitors compliance with the Drinking Water Act. 25 e Inspectorate is part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. For monitoring compliance with the nancial obligations imposed by law, two aspects of the Drinking Water Act are of importance: nancial oversight 26 and the performance comparison (benchmark). 27 Financial oversight takes place annually when the Minister of I&E receives a report from each drinking water company which gives insight into the costs and operating pro ts of the previous calendar year. 28 In case the pro ts earned exceed the predetermined WACC, drinking water companies are required to incorporate a compensation for this in the following year's tari . 29 If Article 11 or 12 of the Drinking Water Act, which provide for the nancial speci cations of the tari and nancial oversight, are not complied with, the Minister of I&E is authorized to give an instruction to the owner of the drinking water company concerned. 30 A deadline is xed before which the instruction has to be complied with and the binding nature of the instruction is underlined by Article 50 of the Drinking Water Act which indicates that administrative enforcement may be exerted by the Minister of I&E. 31 e performance comparison is a triennially recurring systematic comparison which compares the ten drinking water companies on quality, customer service, environmental aspects and cost e ciency. 32 36 Vewin is the Association of Dutch Water Companies of which all ten drinking water companies are member. e Minister of I&E and the drinking water companies receive a copy of the performance comparison from the Inspectorate. 37 On the basis of this benchmark, drinking water companies have to indicate which improvements they will make. e Minister of I&E informs both Houses of the States General of the intentions of the drinking water companies. 38 Additionally, this benchmarking ought to play a role in the decentralized nancial supervision of the drinking water sector. Decentralized supervision of the drinking water sector refers to the fact that in the Netherlands, the shareholders of the drinking water companies are municipalities and provinces. e supervision they exercise as shareholders, covers the common nancial monitoring that a shareholder exercises on his business. e shareholders of the drinking water companies, which have an important role since they are also responsible for approving the drinking water tari , 39 are expected to use the results for supervising purposes. 40 Using the benchmark however, is not obligatory for the shareholders. e circumstance that it is up to the shareholders to decide how -and whether -to use the results of the benchmark con rms the so character of this part of decentralized nancial supervision of the drinking water companies.
e leeway for the shareholders in exercising decentralized supervision is strengthened by the fact that not more than an advisory role is reserved for the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). is is the regulatory authority of the Dutch economy, charged with the supervision and regulation of network sectors, the enforcement of competition law and consumer law.
e Drinking Water Regulation stipulates that the Minister of I&E has to ask advice from the ACM when 33 Vewin (2013) 
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it sets the WACC and the maximum percentage of equity. 41 e Drinking Water Regulation obliges the Inspectorate to ask advice from the ACM for the nancial oversight and the monitoring whether the provisions of the drinking water regulation dealing with the drinking water tari s are complied with. 42 It deserves to be mentioned that the advice of the ACM has been consistently taken over by the Minister of I&E in the determination of both the WACC and the maximum percentage of equity. 43 In case the Minister of I&E would intend to deviate from the advice of the ACM, the General Administrative Law Act obliges the Minister of I&E to properly motivate its intention. 44 While there is no explicit legal obligation to do so, 45 the ACM gives stakeholders the chance to give their opinion upon the draadvice of the ACM.
It follows from the above that economic regulation is a shared responsibility between the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate and the drinking water companies. If anything should go wrong, the drawback of the current situation is that it is di cult to indicate who exactly is responsible. For instance, in case the tari of drinking water is clearly excessive, it is di cult to point out who should be held accountable. Reason for this is that while the tari is set by a decision from the shareholders of the drinking water company, the problem might not be an erroneous decision of the shareholders, but for example an overly excessive WACC rate set by the Minister of I&E on the basis of advice from the ACM. Or, the high tari may lie in an unnecessary increase in the production costs on the part of the drinking water companies, or a high maximum percentage of equity -also determined by the Minister of I&E on the basis of advice from the ACM. As for every aspect of the drinking water tari a di erent player is involved, the question of who is ultimately responsible for the drinking water tari cannot easily be answered. Considering that safe drinking water is a necessity of life, little has to be done to demonstrate that the provision of drinking water is a service of general interest. 46 However, the question whether the provision of drinking water is a service of general economic interest needs more consideration. In this regard, the classi cation of services in EU law as services of general interest (SGI) matters.
ese SGIs are divided into services of general economic interest (SGEI) and services of general non-economic interest (SGNEI). 47 If the provision of drinking water would be classi ed as a SGEI, a wider set of EU rules applies than if the classi cation would be as a SGNEI: most notably EU competition laws come into sight at the classi cation as SGEI since the drinking water companies are then 'undertakings' within the meaning of EU competition law. 48 4.1.1. Guidelines stemming from the ECJ Case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) indicates that whether an activity is of an economic nature, should be decided on the basis of a functional approach. Consequently, no clearly de ned criteria are used to de ne economic activity. Nevertheless, guidance can be found in case law. For example in Ambulanz Glöckner, the ECJ stated that "any activity consisting in o ering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity." 49 In Compass-Datenbank, the ECJ stated that "activities which fall within the exercise of public powers are not of an economic nature." 50 Until now, not many activities have been found to fall within this exception, as it applies only to classic state activities, such as the army or the police. 
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Next to the exercise of public powers, the solidarity exception is also approved by the ECJ to rule out the application of the EU competition rules. is exception applies when an activity ful ls an exclusively social function. 52 It is apparent from the wording and application practice of the solidarity exception that this exception is tailored for social security and health schemes. 53 e ECJ, by repeatedly omitting to mention the possibility of classifying an activity as a SGNEI, starts from the preposition that the choice is between either qualifying an activity as a normal economic activity or as a SGEI. 54 It is therefore not so much the 'economic nature' upon which the Member States have a broad discretion. Instead, the wide margin of discretion appears to apply to whether a certain activity is of general interest or not -subject to control against manifest errors. 55 In BUPA, the ECJ con rms this reading by stating that a Member State cannot exercise its powers to de ne SGEIs "for the sole purpose of removing a particular sector … from the application of the competition rules." 56 On the basis of the functional approach of the ECJ, the Commission, the ACM and several other Member States -like the United Kingdom and France -have taken the stance that the provision of drinking water is an economic activity. 57
From functional case law to a formalistic view
In contrast to the functional approach of the ECJ, the Dutch government takes a formalistic view and considers the provision of drinking water a SGNEI. 58 In a reply specifying the choice for the classi cation of the provision of drinking water as a SGNEI, the then Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Minister of H, SP&E) 59 put forward that it is up to the Member States to decide whether they classify a SGI as economic or not. According to this reply, whether an activity is of an economic nature depends upon the extent to which the entity performing the 
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Intersentia public task is free to determine the services to be provided, the tari s and the manner in which the services are provided. e Minister of H, SP&E noted that a limited freedom in this regard points towards the existence of a SGNEI. 60 us, the Dutch government advocates a very formalistic view, focusing on the actual organization of the drinking water sector. It does not look at the nature of the activities and the scope for competition, for instance by considering the organization of the drinking water sector in other countries
Summary
In spite of the opinion of the Dutch government, case law of the ECJ, the approach of the Commission and practice from other Member States provide strong arguments that the provision of drinking water is a SGEI. Accordingly, the provision of drinking water has to be regarded as an economic activity. is has as consequence that the drinking water companies are undertakings within the meaning of EU competition law. Considering that the mandatory character of the public monopolies makes it impossible for foreign companies to enter the Dutch drinking water sector, crossborder trade is impeded. As a result, EU (competition) law applies to the provision of drinking water in the Netherlands. e following sub-paragraphs will investigate how the economic nature of the provision of drinking water a ects the requirements that are applicable to the organization of the economic regulation of the drinking water sector.
REQUIREMENTS FLOWING FROM PRIMARY EU LAW
e rst indication of the requirements owing from EU law, comes from Article 106 TFEU. Its rst paragraph encompasses a prohibition addressed to Member States having public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights. ese Member States are not allowed to enact or maintain in force "any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular those provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 [TFEU] ." e prohibition of Article 106(1) TFEU demonstrates that both EU competition law and internal market law in uence the organization of economic regulation of the Dutch drinking water sector. 
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In light of EU law, Article 102 TFEU provides the most stringent rules for the organization of the Dutch drinking water sector. Considering that drinking water companies have a dominant position -they are monopolist in their supply areaeconomic regulation needs to ensure that the drinking water companies are not led to infringe Article 102 TFEU. Should economic regulation fail to do so, the Netherlands risks infringement of Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU. 62 Reading of Article 106(1) TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU signi es that the four freedoms related to the attainment and maintenance of the internal market may not be obstructed by Member States. And indeed, even though the EU acknowledges the existence of SGEIs and state monopolies, the basic rules on free movement still apply to these areas. 63 For reasons of clarity, it should be stressed that this article does not seek to challenge the organization of the Dutch drinking water sector as a public monopoly. Instead, it seeks to nd the applicable requirements to which the economic regulation of the drinking water sector has to comply. at the Dutch drinking water sector is in hands of public undertakings is not necessarily problematic. Under EU law, ownership is of no in uence to the applicable rules while public and private providers of services of general (economic) interest "are subject to the same rights and obligations." 64 However, public monopolies may con ict with the free movement rules. Whether and how the free movement rules are infringed by the existence of public monopolies, falls outside the scope of this article. 65 is article focusses on the institutional design of the Dutch drinking water sector and its compliance with the principles of good regulation to make sure there are adequate safeguards to prevent that economic regulation leads to infringement of Articles 106, lid 1 and 102 TFEU.
WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE
Secondary EU law also gives guidance to economic regulation of the drinking water sector. In this regard, the EU Water Framework Directive 66 needs to be mentioned. In Infringements of the free movement rules however, may be justi ed by justi cation grounds which can be relied upon by the Netherlands. For a more elaborate account on the requirements stemming from EU law, see TILEC Discussion paper 2015 no 2, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2552036. 
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Intersentia the exercise of its duties -for example in tari setting -the regulatory authority should take account of the Water Framework Directive.
Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive indicates that the principle of recovery of costs and the polluter pays principle are to be recognized in the price for water services. 67 Additionally, this Article also indicates that water-pricing policies should provide incentives to use water resources e ciently. According to the Commission, this is essential as a sustainable use of water resources is stimulated when users of water services are confronted with the real costs of their water usage. 68 A recent judgment of the ECJ con rmed the importance of the principle of costrecovery and the polluter pays principle. 69 However, in its judgment, the ECJ also indicated that the Water Framework Directive is not necessarily infringed if a particular water service is not subject to the principle of cost-recovery. 70 Key is that the objective of the Water Framework Directive, i.e. protection of the environment, is not jeopardized -but the principle of recovery of costs and the polluter pays principle are valuable instruments to achieve protection of the environment. 71 Considering that the Framework Directive indicates that water-pricing policies should provide "adequate incentives for users to use water resources e ciently," 72 it should be noted that this is not entirely re ected in the Drinking Water Act. 73 Drinking water companies are not subject to any obligation to incentivize users of drinking water to an e cient water use. Whether the polluter-pays principle is su ciently obeyed is also questionable, as pollution costs are spread over all users rather than that every polluter is charged for his actual share. 74 e exact amount of pollution per domestic user -which is, admittedly, di cult to asses -is therefore not taken into account. 
68
See <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/info/intro_en.htm>; it should be kept in mind, however, that it is rather di cult to calculate real costs of water usage per citizen, as these costs are bound to vary per person and per region. 
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD REGULATION
Next to EU law, principles of good regulation are equally relevant for organizing economic regulation of the drinking water sector. 75 ese norms are important for the organization of economic regulation of the drinking water sector, as they form a basis for legislation and regulation in the network industries in EU Member states and beyond. 76 is basis consists of norms which, although di erently colored according to the situation in which they are used by di erent authorities employing them, provide a core of "normative, universal values" 77 which are generally re ected in legislation and practice as norms that are guaranteed. ese norms do not necessarily ow from legal provisions, but from di erent sources such as the OECD, scienti c literature, international organizations and national governments. In the EU, they are generally referred to as general principles of EU law since also the ECJ recognizes them in its case law. 78 It should be noted that as of 4 June 2015, also principles of good regulation from the OECD are e ective. e OECD has identi ed twelve principles relating to the e ectiveness, e ciency, trust and engagement of water governance. 79 Part of these principles corresponds to principles used in this article for the assessment of economic regulation of the Dutch drinking water sector. e OECD for example, also recognizes that transparency and participation are crucial for a well-functioning (drinking) water sector. e OECD has indicated that it expects that these principles will lead to "concrete changes from governments and stakeholders." 80 Despite their di erences in legal status, it is well-established that principles of good regulation play a role in the assessment of economic regulation. 81 e implementation of the principles of good regulation provides safeguards to protect the water users against the drinking water companies abusing their dominant position. In the context of economic regulation of the drinking water sector, the role of the EU principles of good regulation can be understood as the provision of a See <www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/OECD-Principles-on-Water-Governance-brochure.pdf>. 80 See <www.oecd.org/governance/oecd-principles-on-water-governance-from-vision-to-action.htm>. 
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Intersentia normative framework within which assessment of European and national legislation, administration, regulation and enforcement can take place. 82
INDEPENDENCE
In early case law the ECJ stated that the national regulatory authority that is in charge of the application of economic regulation needs to be independent from market parties. 83 Independence of the implementation of the law can partially be guaranteed by the law itself by providing the conditions and restrictions for its application by the responsible regulatory authority. However the law cannot regulate every economic aspect of the drinking water sector. erefore the law needs to su ciently exible to be adapted to changing economic, environmental and social circumstances. is can be ensured by attributing the regulatory authority a su cient degree of discretion for the application of the applicable regulatory framework. 84 Independence of the market parties is in particular essential to ensure that stakeholders with a dominant position cannot in uence the content of economic regulation. 85 According to the ECJ, the requirement of independence of the regulatory authority, owing from Articles 106 and 102 TFEU, guarantees the "equality of opportunity" 86 between economic operators. In its case law, the ECJ suggest that more is needed than merely independence from market parties with a dominant position. Independence from all market parties -public and private -is required. 87 In light of Article 4(3) TEU which contains the principle of sincere cooperation, the application of the principle of independence from market parties implies that independence from all market parties needs to be achieved to ensure an e ective application of EU 
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(competition) law. 88 us, in order to guarantee fair competition, the principle entails that the regulatory authority should be independent from all market parties. 89 e second aspect of independence -political independence -is not (yet) as rmly established. 90 It remains controversial to demand from Member States to separate their regulatory authorities entirely or partly from political in uence. 91 A recent OECD report on the governance of regulators, recognizes this. 92 e stance of the OECD elucidates that choices that are predominantly of a political nature should be le to a Ministry. Applied to the drinking water sector, such political policy choices which should be in hands of the government include the decision on what is a ordable drinking water and on the quality that drinking water should (at least) have. A politically independent regulator, is in charge of guaranteeing that this desired qualitatively good drinking water is available at an a ordable price. In order to do so, the independent regulatory authority takes independently (day-to-day) regulatory decisions and uses di erent instruments by which it autonomously tries to achieve these policy objectives. 93 ese decisions, for example the determination of the WACC, the maximum percentage of equity and of the tari s, should be taken without political interference. 94 In order to create stability in regulatory decision-making, 95 to address con icts of interest and to develop regulatory expertise, political independence is also encouraged by the OECD. 96 Not too long ago, also the Commission has interfered in the political autonomy of the Member States, by imposing independence requirements for the regulation of the energy and electronic communications sector. is can be seen in 88 See in this regard also S. Lavrijssen and A. Ottow, ' e Legality of Independent Regulatory Authorities', in: L. Besselink, F. Pennings and A. Prechal (eds.), e Eclipse of Legality, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 81-82; and see M. de Visser, Network-based governance in EC law: the example of EC competition and EC communications law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 85, who states that "it is reasonable to infer that national competition authorities must be absolutely independent from commercial actors"; thereby also referring to every actor and not only to actors with a dominant position. Ibid.
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In its report, the OECD refers to regulatory decisions in general. In the drinking water sector however, these regulatory decisions would be for example the determination of the WACC and the tari for drinking water. In light of the principle of independence, these competences should be competences of an independent regulatory authority, not of a Minister or a drinking water company. 96 OECD (2014), ' e Governance of Regulators', pp. 50-51.
Intersentia
Article 3(3a) of Directive 2009/140/EC on electronic communications which stipulates that national regulatory authorities do not "seek or take instructions from any other body" in relation to the (by EU law designated) task they carry out. is shows that the awareness of the importance of political independence is growing. 97 In the Netherlands, the ACM is in charge of regulating these sectors. 98
ACCOUNTABILITY
While independence is indispensable to guarantee objective and consistent decisionmaking, there is a danger that this independence will lead to a regulator acting beyond its mandate. 99 In order to 'curb' this risk, a well-functioning mechanism of accountability is required.
Bovens de nes accountability as "a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences." 100 is practical de nition focuses on the process of giving account. In the organization of economic regulation of the drinking water sector, accountability should in the rst place be directed towards public authorities. 101 is is referred to as political accountability and it entails that the economic regulator renders account to a representative body. 102 is representative body, in the Netherlands this would be the Minister of I&E who is accountable to Parliament, veri es whether the regulatory authority has complied with its duties. For example, the ACM as regulatory authority of, inter alia, the telecommunications and transport sectors is accountable to the Minister of Economic A airs and the Minister of I&E. 103 In case an independent regulator of the drinking water sector would exist that renders account to the Minister of I&E and to the Minister of Economic A airs, they could check, on the basis of information given to them in the process of rendering account, whether the independent regulator ful ls its duties. Political accountability expresses a possibility of democratic control, as in the end, the citizens give feedback 235 on the results of the pursued policies. 104 is is desirable as it allows the Minister, the Parliament and at the end of the accountability chain the electorate, 105 to establish whether public interests are duly protected by the regulatory authority. is guarantees the proper functioning of an independent regulator and strengthens its independence. 106 Secondly, the regulatory authority also needs to give account to the stakeholders, including the users of drinking water, in a more direct way. is is referred to as social accountability. 107 Social accountability is likely to increase support for the activities of the regulatory authority. In that regard, stakeholders might discover incidents in which their interests have insu ciently been taken into account by the regulator, or the regulator has followed the wrong procedure according to a stakeholder. 108 As a consequence, social accountability gives stakeholders the chance to refer such matters to the judiciary if they have legal standing. 109 5.3. TRANSPARENCY e principle of transparency ows from the principle of democracy, 110 whereby it pursues two di erent aims in the context of economic regulation. Firstly, it provides for legitimacy of the regulatory authority's independence 111 and secondly, the principle of transparency contributes to the e ectiveness 112 of economic regulation. 104 Ibid, p. 360. It should be noted that also in the absence of an independent regulator, accountability of the regulator is equally important; see for the relationship between independence and accountability P. Larouche (2014), 'CERRE, Code of Conduct and Best Practices for the setup, operations and procedure of regulatory authorities', pp. 14-15. 107 Ibid, pp. 17-18. Legitimacy is understood in the sense that the regulator may be independent, but only if it is guaranteed that the regulator will provide insight in its actions. In that way, being transparent legitimises the independence of the regulator, see M. Aelen (2014), Beginselen van goed markttoezicht -Gede nieerd, verklaard en uitgewerkt voor het toezicht op de nanciële markten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2014, p. 333.
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According to Aelen, transparency contributes to e ective regulation in di erent ways. For example, publication of monitoring information by the regulator contributes to transferring the applicable norms to regulated parties -thereby possibly achieving a higher rate of compliance; see M. Aelen (2014), Beginselen van goed markttoezicht -Gede nieerd, verklaard en uitgewerkt voor het toezicht op de nanciële markten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2014, pp. 333-334.
Intersentia
In EU (case) law, several aspects of the principle of transparency have been recognized, such as the right of access to documents, 113 and the ECJ refers to the 'general principle of transparency' in the eld of public service concessions. 114 e de nition given by Hancher, Larouche and Lavrijssen thoroughly denotes the requirements which this principle imposes upon economic regulation in the drinking water sector: the regulatory authority needs to be "open with stakeholders about their objectives, processes, record and decisions. Moreover, authorities should explain to the citizens and the regulated rms the rationales of their decisions. Given that authorities are liable to be "captured" (at least as far as their attention and their information is concerned) by the regulated rms, the principle of transparency could even go as far as to require authorities actively to seek the involvement of other interests, in particular customers and citizens, in their activities." 115 In light of this de nition, the principle of transparency requires transparency of the processes which lead to actions and decisions of the regulatory authority in the drinking water sector. Transparency of the accountability processes is equally required. Whereas transparency requires openness from the regulator, the principle of transparency could play a role in verifying whether economic regulation complies with other principles of good regulation. 
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the drinking water sector. 118 is principle has been acknowledged implicitly by the ECJ. In Council v Access Info Europe for instance, the ECJ notes in respect of the right of access to documents, that access to documents "enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process." 119 Participation is also referred to in Article 11 TEU.
Alemanno argues that since the principle of participation has found a base in the Treaties -most notably in Article 11 TEU 120 -'judicialization' of participatory requirements by the ECJ can be awaited. 121 According to the Commission, "improved participation is likely to create more con dence in the end result." 122 Creating more con dence in the end result thus entails participation in the process leading to that result. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the predominantly so law nature of participation has as consequence that its abilities to legitimize a regulatory outcome by increasing the acceptance of the outcome could be limited. 123 In this regard, enforceable rights of participation are better placed to increase the legitimacy of regulatory outcomes.
EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTION
Given that legal accountability towards stakeholders gives stakeholders the chance to address potential violations of their rights at the judiciary, the link between e ective legal protection and the principle of accountability is a given. As a result, e ective legal protection is also referred to as judicial or legal accountability. 124 In Johnston, the ECJ stated that the principle of e ective legal protection, 125 which is also is enshrined as a right in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, is a general principle of EU law. 126 Since then, the ECJ 
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Intersentia regularly underlines that e ective legal protection is necessary to enforce the rights that parties derive from EU law and which are a ected by decisions of national regulatory authorities. 127 In principle, e ective legal protection is o ered by the judiciary, which examines whether one's rights have been violated. Scrutiny by an independent third party -the judiciary -is vital, as otherwise, granted rights would be empty.
EFFECTIVENESS
e consequences for economic regulation which ow from the principle of e ectiveness, come from the principle of e ectiveness as a principle of good regulation.
is principle of good regulation needs to be distinguished from the principle of e ectiveness, o en referred to by the ECJ in its case law concerning the application of EU law in national legal orders. 128 e Commission states that the principle of e ectiveness as a principle of good regulation entails that "policies must be e ective and timely, delivering what is needed on the basis of clear objectives, an evaluation of future impact and, where available, of past experiences. E ectiveness also depends on implementing EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the most appropriate level." 129 is de nition shows that the principle of e ectiveness is non-binding. Nonetheless, the de nition indicates that e ectiveness should act as an obligation resting upon both legislator and regulator when dra ing legislation, policies and taking decisions. 130 e national dimension of the principle of e ectiveness as a principle of good regulation, is not shaped from an 'obligation imposing' viewpoint. Rather, it starts from the viewpoint that the government serves the public interests. 131 is starting point leads to the interpretation of the principles of e ectiveness as a requirement that public intervention must be e cient and e ective. In that context, the priniciples of e ectiveness implies that national procedural laws may not render the exercise of rights owing from EU law "practically impossible or excessively di cult", see ECJ 
ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT FORM OF REGULATION OF THE DRINKING WATER SECTOR IN LIGHT OF PRINCIPLES OF GOOD REGULATION
Now that the most relevant principles of good regulation have been set out for economic regulation of the drinking water sector, the current form of economic regulation will be assessed. In the assessment of economic regulation, weaknesses in light of the principles of good regulation will be discussed regarding the di erent phases of the regulatory process, i.e. the tari , the benchmark, the WACC, the maximum percentage of equity and the nancial oversight.
INDEPENDENCE
As has come forward in paragraph 5.1, the principle of independence is comprised of two elements: independence from market parties and political independence. Observance of these two elements is not re ected in economic regulation of the drinking water sector. In the process of tari setting, shareholders of the drinking water companies are exclusively competent to approve the drinking water tari . 133 Together with the Minister of I&E, they are responsible for (part of) the nancial oversight. Whereas shareholders (the provinces and municipalities) are not independent from the drinking water companies -and thus politics is not independent from the market -a con ict of interest may arise in the determination of the tari . 134 is organization of economic regulation neither guarantees political independence, nor independence from the market.
Political independence of the economic regulator o ers certain advantages, such as the prevention of con icts of interests and avoidance of prevalence of short-term, political interests in regulation of the drinking water sector. Considering this, su cient political independence could prove very useful. 135 Likewise, a certain degree of political independence to take regulatory decisions -like tari setting -has a positive e ect on attracting investments and fostering innovation, as it increases the likelihood of consistent economic regulation based on the needs of the market. 136 In the Dutch drinking water sector, however, economic regulation is not politically Also by letting shareholders have the nal say on the tari , the risk arises that short-term political interests of the decentralized governments will prevail. 137 A con ict of interest arises when the shareholders of the drinking water companies need to act in the interest of the user in setting the tari . Considering their capacity as municipality or province, there is a risk that shareholders might give less priority to the (long term) interests of users of water. 138 An example may be the su erance tax levied by municipalities in their capacity as municipalities.
is su erance tax is paid by drinking water companies, who pass it on to their users. e decision of municipalities to charge such a tax may be at odds with the role of municipalities as shareholders -in the latter position they ought to make sure that users of drinking water pay a ordable drinking water tari s. However, in taking the decision with regard to the su erance taxes, the municipalities my let their nancial interests prevail.
Independence from market parties is at stake in the execution of the benchmark. Due to the lack of solid safeguards, stakeholders are provided insu cient guarantees that a party independent from the drinking water companies assesses their performance. On the basis of the Drinking Water Act, the Inspectorate is responsible for carrying out the triennial performance comparison. 139 Initially, execution of the benchmark was le to Vewin, the Association of Dutch Water Companies. 140 e Inspectorate has issued the 'Protocol Performance Comparison Drinking Water Companies 2012' concerning the content and set-up of the benchmark. ere, the Inspectorate stated that it will monitor correct observance of the protocol and the presentation of the data. 141 ere was however no explanation of which measures were available to ensure compliance with the protocol, or of how the Inspectorate monitored observance of the protocol. 241 that the Inspectorate prepares the report, is an improvement in light of the independence of the market parties. However, the role of Vewin in the benchmark remains considerable, since it remains responsible for the facilitation of the delivery of the data and the standardization of this data. Since Vewin is not independent from the drinking water companies, there is still room for improvement in light of the principle of independence.
e OECD has also identi ed the need for more independence, as it calls for "independent oversight, at an arm's length from water institutions." 142 Four concrete limitations of the current benchmark were addressed by the OECD to underpin its call for 'independent oversight' on drinking water companies. ese limitations are (i) "the decreased number of reference observations in the benchmark [which] likely reduces the potential e ectiveness of benchmarking in identifying under performance"; (ii) "the lack of a third-party involvement in service quality performance assessment or monitoring [which] is all the more challenging when there is a reduced number of players with higher risks of monopolistic behaviour"; (iii) "[that] the information and capacity asymmetry between companies and their shareholders to understand common assessments related to the annual approved investment packages and criteria for decision making can be a challenge"; and (iv) "[that] investments considered as 'technically essential' by companies may not be understood (or further investigated) by their public shareholders. In such cases, an independent authority that would carry out the benchmark exercise and use results to set tari s may help to avoid the vicious circles of under-investment or expensive technological or infrastructure options, and achieve better water demand management and more environmentally friendly innovations." 143 6.2. ACCOUNTABILITY Whereas the Minister of I&E is accountable to Parliament, the Minister needs to be fully informed about the activities and performances of the drinking water companies. However, successful accountability requires transparency. 144 e fact that the Inspectorate was unable to assess the cost-e ectiveness of the drinking water tari s because the drinking water companies did not make clear how the costs were 
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Intersentia incorporated in their tari s, 145 testi es that political accountability is limited by a lack of transparency.
As has been seen in the second paragraph, the political accountability relations in the drinking water sector are also hampered by the variety of players involved in the drinking water sector. In that regard, it may be noted that in the current situation, the Minister of I&E and the Inspectorate render insu ciently account for their actssuch as the decision to set the WACC and the maximum percentage of equity -to stakeholders. e Inspectorate is accountable to the Minister of I&E who renders account to the Parliament, that represents the citizens -the latter including stakeholders in the drinking water sector. During elections, citizens can base their vote on their stance concerning economic regulation of the drinking water sector. For example on the basis of information obtained on national accountability day which takes place every year. On this day, the Ministry of I&E provides the Parliament with a publicly available annual report in which it explains whether and how the Ministry's pre-set objectives have been achieved. 146 However, this is a rather remote way of rendering account as it gives stakeholders hardly an opportunity to make their position known to the Minister of I&E or to the Inspectorate. Due to this remoteness, information from stakeholders regarding the obtained results of economic regulation, the way in which implemented policies are perceived and whether reorientation is desired according to stakeholders is less likely to reach the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate and ultimately Parliament.
A similar drawback considering accountability exists between the drinking water companies and ultimately the stakeholders. Whereas theoretically, drinking water users can hold the shareholders of the drinking water companies accountable during municipal of provincial elections -the shareholders are democratically elected municipalities and provinces -this is not an e ective accountability mechanism. e electorate votes on the entire set of political policies of the last four years pursued by the decentralized government. Considering this, the vote of the electorate is too indirect to be led back to feedback on the shareholders of the drinking water companies. Moreover, other factors further complicate this type of accountability. For example, the supply areas of the drinking water companies do not coincide with municipal or provincial borders. 147 is means that there are cases imaginable where a user of drinking water wishing to use his vote during provincial or municipal elections to express his (dis)satisfaction with a shareholder of his drinking water company, cannot do so because he is not allowed to vote in the province of municipality that is the shareholder. 145 Inspectorate, 'Toezicht Drinkwatertarieven -Beoordeling tarieven 2012', p. 10. 146 See for the most recent report of the Ministry of I&E <www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ verantwoordingsdag/verantwoordingsdagstukken>; this annual report, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment -of which the Inspectorate is part -gives account for the expenditures, income and commitments compared to the budget of the Ministry. 147 See annex 1 to the Drinking Water Regulation. 243 e identi ed lack of transparency also creates an information gap between stakeholders and the regulator which acts as an obstacle in the process of rendering account. is is a pity, as this type of social accountability may eminently be suited to create public support and acceptance of regulatory actions. 148 Exemplary for this is the benchmark. Where drinking water companies are meant to be accountable to stakeholders by way of the benchmark, 149 the benchmark as accountability mechanism falls short. Firstly, shareholders are not obliged to use the benchmark in their supervision of the drinking water company. Secondly, other stakeholders, such as captive users of drinking water, end up empty-handed: they cannot induce changes on the basis of the benchmark results. Neither can they switch to a better performing drinking water company to 'punish' underperforming drinking water companies. Only the drinking water companies are in the position to actually address potential shortcomings revealed by the performance comparison. e results of the benchmark are thus not given su cient weight in the accountability process between drinking water companies and stakeholders.
TRANSPARENCY
e Drinking Water Act stipulates that the tari for drinking water has to be "coste ective, transparent and non-discriminatory." 150 In order to guarantee this, detailed transparency requirements are written down in law. However, transparency requirements regarding the drinking water tari s 151 -applicable to all drinking water companies -are poorly met in practice.
Each drinking water company is obliged to publish an overview of their drinking water tari s with a speci cation that shows how their tari s are derived from their operational costs, depreciation costs, costs of capital and taxation costs. 152 Consultation of the available overviews for 2014 shows that not one of the drinking water companies indicated the relation between the costs and the tari s, as required by Article 10(3) Drinking Water Decision. 153 148 See in this regard sub-paragraph 5.2 'Accountability' of this article. 
Intersentia
Similarly, also information obtained in the process of the benchmark su ers from a lack of transparency, despite that the benchmark is presented as a means to provide openness to stakeholders. 154 While the 'Protocol Performance Comparison Drinking Water Companies 2012' issued by the Inspectorate provides insight on what information needs to be delivered by the drinking water company, this information is not made public. In this regard, it must be noted that only the end-report -containing the results of the benchmark -is publicly available. is end-report does not show the structure of the categories of costs of the drinking water companies. As a consequence, it is not possible to verify the information upon which the costs are calculated.
erefore, it is not transparent which information forms the basis of the benchmark. 155 A con rmation of the general lack of transparency in economic regulation can be found in the results of nancial oversight. In a report concerning the tari s of drinking water in 2012 -containing a separate assessment of each drinking water company 156 -the Inspectorate 157 concluded that none of the drinking water companies could make su ciently clear how the costs were incorporated in the 2012 drinking water tari s. 158 us, on crucial points like the composition of the tari s and the performance comparison, a lack of transparency comes forward. A study has shown that it is possible that users of drinking water are charged too high a tari for drinking water. 159 A lack of transparency only further increases the risk of overpayment by users of drinking water.
PARTICIPATION
It is striking that stakeholder participation is virtually absent in economic regulation of the drinking water sector. Users, lobby groups, consumers groups and experts have 245 no formal possibility to play a role in economic regulation of the drinking water sector.
Only in the demarcation of the WACC rate, there is a minor role for stakeholder involvement. For this demarcation, the Minister of I&E is required to seek advice from the ACM. 160 In preparation of its advice, the ACM o ers the chance to stakeholders to submit their point of view regarding the proposed WACC rate. 161 e ACM gives its reaction on the viewpoints and notes that it takes them into account. 162 e way in which this is done, however, is not explained. at stakeholders involvement remains this insigni cant, is unfortunate as the advice of the ACM has important consequences for economic regulation of the drinking water sector. It has been seen in the second paragraph that the Minister of I&E and the Inspectorate consistently adopt the advice from the ACM. 163 erefore, the current form of stakeholder participation is weak. Stakeholders do not know which role their viewpoint plays in the process of advising the Minister of I&E. Furthermore, they cannot ask a court to review whether their point of view has been taken into account and neither can they ask an administrative court to review the decision by which the rate for the WACC is adopted (see also below). is is because both the advice of the ACM and the decision concerning the WACC rate taken by the Minister of I&E are not appealable. 164 Because stakeholder participation comes close to non-existing, economic regulation does not bene t from the input of users, interest groups, experts and other stakeholders which can enhance the quality and e ectiveness of the regulation. Moreover, neither the role of user participation as a way to achieve more legitimacy of the process of tari setting by the drinking water companies, due to weak social accountability, is achieved.
EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTION
In the current organization of the drinking water sector, e ective legal protection is seriously compromised. Stakeholders have little possibilities to directly refer a case to a (specialized) administrative court. is follows from the fact that the decision of the Minister to set the WACC is not appealable. 165 Neither the tari decisions of the drinking water companies are appealable, as these decisions can be considered private See Article 10(3) Drinking Water Act, which stipulates that the decision of the Minster of I&E regarding the determination of the WACC rate is not appealable. 165 Article 10(3) Drinking Water Act.
Intersentia acts and do not entail administrative acts. Also the advisory role of the ACM undermines the possibilities for e ective legal protection as the advice has no legal e ects and accordingly, stakeholders do not bene t from e ective legal protection because of a lack of legal standing at the administrative court. In case the ACM would be empowered to adopt decisions, stakeholders would perhaps have a chance to directly challenge acts of the ACM in the administrative court and to hold it judicially accountable.
In the current situation, the decision of the Minister to set the WACC on the basis of advice of the ACM or the tari decisions of the drinking water companies can only be challenged indirectly. For example in civil proceedings against drinking water companies based on tort law in which it is claimed that the prices are excessive and amount to a violation of Article 102 TFEU. is, however, is a burdensome route for the users due to the heavy burden of proof and the costs of civil proceedings. By addressing a potential abuse of a dominant position of a drinking water company at the ACM in its capacity as competition authority, a user may also seek legal protection. In order to ask from the ACM to take a decision on whether the drinking water company abuses its dominant position, the user needs to be legally quali ed as an 'interested party'. 166 In general, individuals are not easily granted the status of 'interested party'. Consumer organizations that are representative organizations on the other hand, do receive the status of 'interested party' if their interests are deemed to include the general and collective interests which they particularly represent in accordance with their objects and as evidenced by their actual activities. 167 Alternatively, dispute resolution committees -like the Disputes Resolution Committee on Water 168 -may also play a role in o ering legal protection to the water users. 169 While the Disputes Resolution Committee on Water o ers clear advantages to drinking water users -it acts for example more swi ly and costs less than judicial dispute resolution by a court -170 these bene ts do not justify the absence of judicial review by an independent administrative judge. e Disputes Resolution Committee on Water is only competent to settle disputes between users and drinking water companies that relate to the establishment or implementation of contracts concerning 166 Article 1:2(1) General Administrative Law Act. 247 the connection to and/or the supply of drinking water. 171 is means that the Disputes Resolution Committee on Water cannot give a ruling on the WACC, the maximum percentage of equity of drinking water companies and the determination of the drinking water tari . Hence, the existence of the Dispute Resolution Committee on Water does not take away the importance of the possibility to refer a case to the Appeals Tribunal for Trade and Industry. 172 e Appeals Tribunal for Trade and Industry, is the highest administrative court for economic regulation in the Netherlands. It is competent to decide on regulatory issues in other network sectors, such as the determination of a tari or a WACC rate in the energy sector. To guarantee e ective legal protection, it is important that ultimately an independent administrative court may review regulatory decisions that a ect the interests of the water users.
e lack of e ective legal protection considerably a ects the credibility of good economic regulation of the drinking water sector. It takes away the possibility of direct legal scrutiny of acts of the Minister and the ACM by an independent administrative court. In the absence of the possibility of direct administrative appeal against essential elements of the drinking water tari s, stakeholders have little chance to hold the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate and the drinking water companies judicially accountable for their acts.
EFFECTIVENESS
Whereas economic regulation does not fully respect the above discussed principles, it is di cult to assess whether the way in which nancial oversight is organized, the drinking water tari and the WACC rate are determined, are e ective in reaching the aim of "cost-e ective, transparent and non-discriminatory" drinking water tari s. 173 According to the Drinking Water Decision, cost-e ectiveness is realized when the drinking water's forecasted turnover from the drinking water tari does not exceed the sum of the estimated costs. 174 However, the nding of the Inspectorate that the composition of the drinking water tari s of 2012 is unclear, 175 indicates that the current organization of economic regulation provides for insu cient safeguards to e ectively protect users against excessive tari s. Moreover, the earlier mentioned point -that the adoption of necessary improvements based on the benchmark results to achieve cost-e ectiveness and transparent tari s depend for a large part upon the intentions of the drinking water companies -also shows that there is still room for improvement regarding the e ectiveness of the benchmark. 
Intersentia
Observance of in particular the principles of transparency, accountability, independence and participation play a crucial role in attaining e ective economic regulation that safeguards the public interest. ese principles make it possible to ascertain whether and how economic regulation attains the public aims it pursues. At the same time, observance of these principles may expose necessary changes to make economic regulation more e ective.
SUMMARY
While an important role in supervising the drinking water companies is reserved for the shareholders of the drinking water companies, independence from market parties is insu ciently guaranteed. is is because the shareholders -by setting the drinking water tari -are not independent from, but part of the market party they supervise. e considerable role of Vewin, the association of the Dutch drinking water companies, in the benchmark, is another factor which compromises the independence of economic regulation. Next to this, economic regulation does not bene t from political independence as the Minister of I&E and the Inspectorate are responsible for the nancial supervision, the determination of the WACC and the maximum percentage of equity.
ese concerns regarding the independence of economic regulation are closely related to the general lack of transparency. Opaqueness regarding the preparation and the consequences of the benchmark call into question its independence in practice. Moreover, transparency requirements are insu ciently observed by the drinking water companies regarding tari s as they do not provide su cient insight in how the tari is derived from their costs. is has been con rmed by the Inspectorate in its assessment of the drinking water tari s of 2012. erefore, users of drinking water are given insu cient insight in the exact composition of the drinking water tari .
It is striking that participation of stakeholders such as users of drinking water, interest groups and experts plays virtually no role in economic regulation of the drinking water sector.
e Drinking Water Act does not provide for forms of participation of stakeholders. Only the ACM gives stakeholders the chance to submit viewpoints regarding a proposed advice, but the role of these submitted viewpoints in the process of giving advice is not clari ed. erefore, possible advantages of user participation, such as improvement of the quality of decisions and more support for regulatory decisions, are still largely neglected in the drinking water sector.
e general lack of transparency, the unchallengeable nature of the decision of the Minster of I&E to x the rate for the WACC and the fact that it is le to drinking water companies to set the tari s and to decide what consequences should be attached to the results of the benchmark considerably undermine e ective legal protection of users of drinking water. Also the role of the ACM, the independent regulatory authority of the Dutch economy, undermines e ective legal protection. Since the Minister of I&E and Inspectorate adopt the advice of the ACM consistently, e ective legal protection is considerably hampered by the unchallengeable nature of advice of the ACM. 249 e current form of economic regulation displays too many gaps in light of the principles of good regulation. As a result, captive users of drinking water are insu ciently protected against potentially undesirable behavior of the drinking water companies.
OTHER FORMS OF ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION: THE UK DRINKING WATER SECTOR AND THE DUTCH ENERGY SECTOR
Certain aspects of other forms of economic regulation may inspire economic regulation of the Dutch drinking water sector. 176 erefore, this paragraph examines how the principles of independence and participation are re ected in economic regulation of the drinking water sector of the UK and the Dutch energy sector. ese sectors are relevant for this research, as they have to some extent similar economic characteristics, related to the natural monopoly character of the transport infrastructures, as the Dutch drinking water sector. Both discussed models of economic regulation have undergone a transition in which independence and participation of users obtained a more central role in safeguarding good regulation. 177 e analysis of these changes may provide a source of inspiration for further debate on the improvement of good regulation in the Dutch drinking water sector.
UNITED KINGDOM'S WATER SECTOR
Like in the Netherlands, domestic users in the UK are captive users. Consequently, each drinking water company 178 is a monopolist. 179 Contrary to the situation in the Netherlands however, non-domestic users that use large amounts of water are not subject to these monopolies: they are in a position to choose their supplier. 180 In order to protect domestic users from the lack of competition, Ofwat acts as independent economic regulator of the drinking water sector. 181 e tasks entrusted to Ofwat are the protection of consumers, ensuring that the regulated companies can nance their 176 See for more regulatory solutions of di erent countries also OECD (2015), ' e Governance of Water Regulators'. In the UK, provision of water and sewerage services are frequently united in one company; for the purpose of this article, companies that also provide drinking water, are referred to as drinking water companies, despite the additional services they o er. 179 See <www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/>. 180 See <www.ofwat.gov.uk/nonhousehold/choose/>. 181 See <www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/>. Intersentia functions and ensuring that the regulated companies perform their functions properly. 182 ese aims largely correspond to the aims pursued by Dutch economic regulation of the water sector. 183 e importance of independence of economic regulators is underlined in the 'Principles for Economic Regulation', a set of principles issued by the government which is in particular applicable to the network sectors, including the water sector. 184 ere, the government states that "independent regulation has been a vital part of the UK's framework for economic regulation since the 1980s and remains central to the UK government's approach." 185 According to the government of the UK, independence of regulation is necessary as it displays several advantages. 186 Independence is, for example, crucial and necessary to guarantee "stability and predictability of regulation and the concentration of regulatory expertise." 187 Next to this, it also attracts investments and ensures that the consumer will only pay for e cient investments. 188 In preparation of Ofwat's price review of 2014 -to determine the price caps for the period 2015-2020 189 -far reaching user participation has been introduced in the UK's (drinking) water sector. 190 Ofwat's encouragement of user participation, 191 based on the awareness that users need to know whether their bills are "fair and legitimate", 192 resulted in the adoption of customer challenge groups by each drinking water company.
ese customer challenge groups are composed of an independent 182 251 chairman 193 and stakeholders such as members from the Consumer Council for Water (CCWater), businesses, representation groups of citizens with speci c needs and the Drinking Water Inspectorate. 194 All customer challenge groups are expected to submit a report to Ofwat alongside the business plan of their drinking water company. In this report, the customer challenge group indicates its view on the business plan of the drinking water company and it explains how the company made use of user participation. 195 Advantages mentioned by Ofwat which led to the implementation of user participation are the attainment of "a fair outcome to the price-setting process," 196 greater customer focus of the drinking water companies and more incentives on the companies to innovate. 197 Ofwat indicates that it will use the reports of the customer challenge groups in the review of the business plans of the drinking water companies. 198 Since drinking water companies are obliged to take into account user's views, and the customer challenge groups hand over a report to Ofwat about their ndings regarding representation of users' views on the business plans, customer challenge groups are able to exercise considerable in uence on the drinking water company. 199 In a review of the customer challenges groups performed by CCWater, CCWater found that customer challenge groups should also be used during future price reviews. 200 From the organization of economic regulation in the UK, it can be seen that independence has advantages regarding the stability and predictably of regulation, whereas it also has a positive e ect on investment in the sector. 201 User participation on the other hand, bene ts economic regulation as users' views can help improve 193 Intersentia regulation. User participation also creates more support for regulatory actions as users may have a better understanding of what they pay for.
DUTCH ENERGY SECTOR
As required by EU law, 202 the ACM acts as independent regulator of the energy sector.
e degree of independence of the ACM does not imply complete autonomy from government policy. 203 Instead, it implies that the independent regulator is able to implement regulations and policies without intervention of the executive. 204 In practice, this means that the ACM is independent from market parties and enjoys political independence. In order to supervise compliance with national and European energy laws, the competences of the ACM range from ex ante tari regulation to ex post intervention by penalizing market parties for infringements of the Energy Act 1998. 205 is independence of the ACM as regulator of the energy sector is coupled with a role for public participation. Public participation is regulated in the Electricity Act 1998, according to which representative organizations should be consulted by the ACM in preparation of method decisions regarding the calculation of several elements of the tari for services provided by the system operators and according to which the joint system operators ought to consult with the representative organizations. 206 e consultation between the network operators and the network users takes place in the 'User platform electricity-and gas system consultation' and concerns for example conditions to gain access to the networks and the network tari s.
rough the involvement of representative organizations in regulatory decision-making, support is aimed to be created for the regulatory decisions taken by the ACM. 207 Despite that the exact involvement of representative organizations displays some weaknesses in practice, 208 the signal is given that stakeholders' involvement in the regulatory decision-making process is valuable. It may create bigger support for the decisions of the ACM and may also prevent the stakeholders from appealing the decision at the administrative court. 
8.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1. CONCLUSIONS e assessment of economic regulation of the drinking water sector shows that the current organization of economic regulation is inadequate in light of the principles of good regulation.
e principles of independence, accountability, transparency, participation, e ective legal protection and e ectiveness are not fully complied with.
e current organization of economic regulation of the drinking water sector neither implements independence from market parties, nor political independence. Due to the role of the shareholders and Vewin in economic regulation, economic regulation of the drinking water sector cannot be independent from market parties. As evidenced by the ndings of the OECD, shareholders of the drinking water companies do not have su cient expertise to assess whether and which investments are necessary in the drinking water sector. is leads to risks of both under-and overinvestment. Where underinvestment could result in drinking water of an inferior quality, overinvestment could result in too high tari s as drinking water might reach a quality which is 'unnecessarily' high. 209 From the viewpoint of the user of drinking water, both scenarios are undesirable.
In addition, economic regulation by the Minister of I&E and the inspectorate demonstrate that there is insu cient political independence. As a consequence, the risk exists that short-term political interests a ect the economic regulation of the drinking water sector.
Economic regulation of the drinking water sector is not in line with the principle of transparency. On crucial points like the composition of the tari s and the performance comparison, a lack of transparency comes forward. e principle of accountability is neither su ciently re ected in economic regulation. e amount of players involved in the drinking water sector and the lack of transparency make it impossible for the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate and the drinking water companies to render account to stakeholders in a transparent and meaningful way.
Furthermore, economic regulation of the drinking water sector provides insu cient possibilities for participation of stakeholders in economic regulation. Since there are no formal possibilities for participation of stakeholders, economic 209 is latter argument is taken from P. Larouche, who indicated that inadequate economic regulation could have as consequence that users of drinking water pay an excessive tari for drinking water because investments are made to increase the quality of drinking water to a level substantially higher than is needed for human consumption.
Intersentia regulation hardly bene ts from input from drinking water users, lobby groups, experts and other stakeholders.
Due to the lack of direct administrative appeal against important components of the drinking water tari and the drinking water tari s themselves, guarantees owing from the principle of e ective legal protection are at stake. Users of drinking water have little chances to receive e ective legal protection from an independent administrative court against acts of the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate, the ACM and the drinking water companies.
As the Minister of I&E, the Inspectorate, the shareholders of the drinking water companies and Vewin are no experts in economic regulation and they cannot guarantee compliance with the principles of good regulation, they are not well suited to act as economic regulator of the drinking water sector. As a consequence, protection of the rights of the users of drinking water is jeopardized.
In the following sub-paragraph, recommendations are made to improve economic regulation of the drinking water sector.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8.2.1. To improve economic regulation of the drinking water sector, an independent and e ective regulatory authority is needed
It has been demonstrated that the transfer of economic regulation of the water sector to a politically independent regulator has clear advantages compared to the current situation. Considering that an independent regulator is more exible than a purely legislative revision of the drinking water sector or other regulatory arrangements like regulation by contract, in the sense that an independent regulator can respond to developments in the market relatively fast and easily, the drinking water sector is expected to obtain the greatest bene ts from an independent regulator. Political independence of the regulator has a positive e ect on attracting investments and fosters innovation, as it increases the likelihood of consistent economic regulation adapted to the needs of the market.
8.2.2.
It is desirable to designate the ACM as independent economic regulator of the drinking water sector as it is well equipped for the task
Because the ACM has speci c expertise to undertake complex assessments which involve legal, technical and economic matters, it is well equipped to act as economic regulator of the drinking water sector. It would not be obvious to create a separate regulator for the water sector in the Netherlands, as the Dutch legislator has recently decided to merge di erent authorities within the ACM, making it responsible for the enforcement of competition law and consumer law as well for the regulation of the network industries. is means the ACM is already in charge of regulating, inter alia,
